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1. Introduction 
On October 19, 2018 the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) issued 
an order for provisional measures in the context of the infringement procedure 
brought by the European Commission against Poland on 2 October 2018, in 
relation to a Polish Law lowering to 65 years the retirement age of judges at the 
Supreme Court (Law on the Supreme Court).  
 Both the infringement proceedings and the provisional measures are 
ground-breaking, for they contribute to define a new role for the European 
Union (EU) in upholding the rule of law within its member States. If 
confirmed, this course of action could pave the way for the emergence of the 
ECJ as a court with full jurisdiction over respect for the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights, overshadowing the traditional boundaries whereunder the 
member States are bound to respect fundamental rights “only when they are 
implementing Union law”.1  
 This essay first examines the substantive grounds of the action for failure to 
fulfil obligations directed against Poland (at the time of writing, still to be 
determined by the Court pursuant to the expedited procedure). It then 
discusses the pre-conditions for interim relief, the provisional measures 
ordered by the Court and possible scenarios in case of non-compliance. It 
finally focuses on the parallel developments under the Rule of Law Framework 
and the Art. 7(1) TEU procedure and offers some reflections as to the 
intertwined relationship between law and politics in the EU, when its very 
founding values are seriously challenged from within. 
 
2. Substantive grounds of the infringement procedure 
Not only does the new Polish Law on the Supreme Court lower the retirement 
age of judges currently in force, appointed to the Supreme Court before the 
date of entry into force of that law (3 April 2018) – whose 6-year mandate, set 
out in the Polish Constitution, would be prematurely terminated. It also grants 
the President of the Republic of Poland discretion to extend the active 
mandate of Supreme Court judges, affected by the lowered retirement age, who 
are given the possibility to request a prolongation of their mandate. There are 
no clear criteria for the President’s decision and no judicial review is available. 
The European Commission decided to refer Poland to the ECJ for the 
 
1 Under Art. 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: “The provisions of this 
Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall 
therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance 
with their respective powers.” Moreover, pursuant to Art. 51(2): “This Charter does not establish any 
new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the 
Treaties.” 
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violations of the principle of judicial independence, including the 
irremovability of judges, created by the Law.2  
 The Commission maintains that Poland fails to fulfil its obligations under 
the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1), of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) read in connection with Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.    
 Under Art. 19(1), second sub-paragraph (added to the EU Treaties via the 
Lisbon Treaty): “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” Art. 47 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial, of which the principle of judicial independence is an 
essential guarantee. In the Commission’s view, having regard to their specific 
duties and the authority attaching to their decisions in the national legal order 
and to the particular obligation to which they are subject under Art. 267(3) 
TFEU,3 the national supreme courts play a central role in the system for the 
application of European law. Any doubts as to the compliance with the 
guarantees of independence as regards those courts are such as to prevent them 
fully from playing that role. Such doubts are also likely to undermine the 
mutual trust between the member States and their respective courts, necessary 
for the principle of mutual recognition, which plays an essential role in 
connection with many legal acts of the EU concerning the area of freedom, 
security and justice, to function. 
 This is the first time the European Commission has initiated an action for 
failure to fulfil obligations related to the rule of law as its exclusive legal basis. 
The Court, however, prepared the ground for such a step in the case Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (so called case of the Portuguese judges).4 On a 
combined reading of Art. 2 TEU (values on which EU is based and common 
to its Member States), Art. 4(3) TEU (principle of sincere cooperation) and 
 
2 European Commission v. Republic of Poland, Case C-619/18, Action brought on 2 October 2018. 
All related documents are available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-619/18. 
This infringement procedure is not the only one launched against Poland over measures affecting the 
judiciary. On 20 December 2017, following the publication of the Polish Law on the Ordinary Courts 
Composition, the Commission had referred to the Court another infringement procedure alleging that 
the Law introducing a different retirement age for female judges (60 years) and male judges (65 years), 
is contrary to Art. 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and Directive 2006/54 on 
gender equality in employment. Also, by giving the Minister of Justice the discretionary power to 
prolong the mandate of judges who have reached retirement age, as well as to dismiss and appoint 
Court Presidents, the Law undermines the independence of Polish courts in violation of Art. 19(1) 
TEU in combination with Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.   
3 As is well known, Art. 267(3) TFEU, concerning the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings, provides that: “Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court 
or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.” 
4 ECJ (Grand Chamber), judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
(Case C-64/16). 
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Art. 19(1) TEU (principle of effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights 
under EU law), the Court stated: “The very existence of effective judicial 
review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule 
of law […]. It follows that every Member State must ensure that the bodies 
which, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, come within its 
judicial system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements of 
effective judicial protection. […] Consequently, […]  the Member State 
concerned must ensure that that court meets the requirements essential to 
effective judicial protection, in accordance with the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU. In order for that protection to be ensured, maintaining such 
a court or tribunal’s independence is essential, as confirmed by the second 
subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to the access to an 
‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy” (paras. 35-37; 40-41 of the Judgment).5 
 This judgment essentially established a general obligation for member 
States to guarantee and respect the independence of their national courts and 
tribunals, solely on the basis of Art. 19(1) TEU read in light of Articles 2 and 
4(3) TEU. This interpretation of Art. 19(1) TEU gives the principle of effective 
judicial protection a much wider scope of application that it would have on the 
basis of Art. 47 of the Charter, which is subject to Art. 51(1). The Court 
exclusively relies on Art. 19(1) TEU having emphasised that this provision 
“relates to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the 
Member States are implementing Union law, within the meaning of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter” (para. 29). The notion of ‘fields covered by Union 
law’ mentioned in Article 19(1) is broadly interpreted by the Court and should 
now be understood as being wider than the notion of ‘implementation’ laid 
down in Article 51(1) of the Charter.6  
 As it has been rightly argued,7 “the Court’s approach, which is centred on 
the notion of ‘fields covered by EU law’ and merely requires the existence of a 
 
5 For the Court, however, the challenged salary-reduction measures did not infringe the EU 
principle of judicial independence because they were a limited and temporary reduction of 
remuneration to help lower the Portuguese State’s excessive budget deficit and applied to various 
categories of public sector employees. In those circumstances, the disputed measures could not be 
perceived as being specifically adopted in respect of the members of the Portuguese Court of Auditors 
and therefore could not be considered to impair the independence of that Tribunal (para. 51). 
6 While the ECJ adopts a broad interpretation of the notion of ‘implementation’ of EU law by 
Member States, the Court has also established that where “a legal situation does not come within the 
scope of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of 
the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction” (See e.g. Case C-
617/10, at para 22). 
7 L. PECH, S. PLATON, Rule of Law backsliding in the EU: The Court of Justice to the rescue? Some 
thoughts on the ECJ ruling in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, in EU Law Analysis, 
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virtual link between relevant national measures and EU law, is ground-
breaking yet compelling. Article 19(1) TEU may from now on be relied upon 
to challenge any national measure which may undermine the independence of 
any national court which may hear ‘questions concerning the application or 
interpretation of EU law’ (para. 40). The key ‘test’ is therefore whether the 
relevant national court has jurisdiction (or not) over potential questions of EU 
law. If this understanding is correct, the Court’s approach may be viewed as 
ground-breaking as most if not all national courts are, at least theoretically, in 
this situation.” 
 Art. 19 TEU may therefore be ‘triggered’ in a much broader set of national 
situations than Art. 47 of the Charter and in areas where there is very little to 
no EU acquis. Stating that Art. 19 including its reference to independence, is 
a relevant parameter of review of national measures, the Court has not only 
enabled natural and legal persons to challenge a broader set of national 
measures. As a self-standing provision whereunder national measures can be 
challenged, Art. 19(1) can also constitute the exclusive legal basis of an 
infringement procedure brought by the European Commission (or another 
member State).  
 
3. Pre-conditions for interim relief 
With its referral, the European Commission also asked the Court to order 
interim measures, restoring Poland’s Supreme Court to its situation before 3 
April 2018, under Art. 279 TFEU.8 
 Because of the immediate risk of serious and irreparable damages in the 
light of the principle of effective legal protection in the context of application 
of EU law, the Commission requested that those measures be ordered before 
Poland submitted its observations, pursuant to Art. 160, para. 7, of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Court of Justice.9 By separate document, the Commission 
also requested the Court to determine the case pursuant to an expedited 
procedure.  
 On 19 October 2018, the Vice-President of the Court, acting as single judge 
before the submission by Poland of its observations in the interim proceedings, 
granted all the Commission’s requests until such time as an order is made 
 
available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/03/rule-of-law-backsliding-in-eu-court-of.html, 
13 March 2018. 
8 “Actions brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have suspensory 
effect. The Court may, however, if it considers that circumstances so require, order that application 
of the contested act be suspended” (Art. 278 TFEU). Under Art. 279 TFEU: “The Court of Justice of 
the European Union may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures.” 
9 Pursuant to Art. 160(7) of the Rule of Procedure: “The President may grant the application even 
before the observations of the opposite party have been submitted. This decision may be varied or 
cancelled even without any application being made by any party.” 
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closing the interim proceedings.10 The Commission’s request that the case be 
determined under the expedited procedure was granted by an order of the 
President of the Court of 16 November 2018.11 
 According to the case-law of the Court, an application for interim relief may 
be granted only if the fumus boni juris and the urgency requirements and, 
where necessary, the weighting up of the interests involved pleads in favour of 
ordering interim measures.  
 Regarding the first requirement, the Vice-President refrains herself from 
establishing its existence and merely considers that the arguments put forward 
by the Commission do not appear prima facie to be manifestly inadmissible or 
wholly unfounded: “Il suffit donc the constater, aux fins de la présente 
procédure inaudita altera parte, qu’il ne saurait être exclu que la condition 
relative au fumus boni juris soit remplie” (para. 17 of the Order). 
 The urgency requirement is found to be met because of the profound and 
immediate change in the composition of the Supreme Court brought about 
already by the Law on the Supreme Court (resulting in the retirement of a 
significant number of Supreme Court judges, including its President and two 
Presidents of Chambers), coupled with the cardinal importance of judicial 
independence as a guarantee of the fundamental right to a fair trial. 
 Should the action for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the 
Commission against Poland be ultimately upheld, all the decisions of the 
Supreme Court up until the decision of the Court of Justice regarding that 
action would have been given without the guarantees connected with the 
fundamental right of all individuals to an independent court or tribunal. In that 
regard, the Vice-President recalls that the requirement of judicial 
independence forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial, 
a right which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which 
individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common 
to the Member States set out in Art. 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule 
of law, will be safeguarded. The infringement of a fundamental right such as 
the right to an independent court or tribunal is thus capable, because of the 
very nature of the infringed right, of giving rise in itself to serious and 
irreparable damage. In the present case, the fact that the Supreme Court is a 
court of last instance and that the decisions of that court up until the judgment 
of the Court of Justice ruling on the action for failure to fulfil obligations will 
 
10 Order of the Vice-President of the Court, 19 October 2018, in Case C-619/18 R, Commission 
v. Poland, supra note 2 [text available in French and Polish].  
11 Order of the President of the Court, 16 November 2018, in Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. 
Poland, supra note 2. Although the subject matter and the conditions triggering an application for 
interim relief and those triggering the expedited procedure are not identical, the reasoning of both 
orders are very similar. 
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therefore have the authority of res judicata enable it to be established that there 
would be a real risk of serious and irreparable damage to individuals if the 
interim measures were not adopted and the action for failure to fulfil 
obligations were to be upheld by the Court. 
 Precisely because the Law on the Supreme Court entered into force on 3 
April 2018 and serious and irreparable damage was already caused, provisional 
measures are not aimed here to preserve the current situation until the Court’s 
judgment, but rather to restore the status quo prior to 3 April 2018 – a result 
normally ensuing from the declaratory judgment that ultimately finds well-
funded the action brought before the ECJ.  
 Finally, in weighting up the interests involved, the Vice-President considers 
that ordering the requested provisional measures would not jeopardize the 
object, but merely postpone the application, of the provisions of national law 
at issue. Conversely, the application of such provisions would be likely to 
irreparably damage the fundamental right to an independent court or tribunal: 
“si le recours en manquement était finalement accueilli, l’application 
immédiate de telles dispositions serait susceptible de porter préjudice d’une 
manière irrémédiable au droit fondamental d’accéder à un tribunal 
indépendant, tel que consacré à l’article 47, deuxième alinéa, de la Charte” 
(para. 25 of the Order).  
 Obviously, this is not a true “mise en balance des intérêts [en jeu]”). On the 
Commission’s side, the Order considers the irreparable damage to the 
fundamental right to an independent court or tribunal that the (continued) 
immediate application of the Law would entail, should the action for failure to 
fulfil obligations be upheld. On the side of the respondent State, however, it 
only states that should the action for failure to fulfil obligations be dismissed, 
the provisional measures would result in a mere postponement in the 
application of the Law and therefore would not seriously jeopardise the 
objective of the provisions in question (“Dans ce contexte, il y a lieu de 
considérer que l’octroi de telles mesures n’est pas de nature à compromettre 
gravement l’objectif poursuivi par ces dispositions” (para. 24)). At stake, 
however, is a sovereign State’s jurisdiction to prescribe, which includes the 
power to adopt legislative provisions and to decide the time and manner of 
their entry into force. It is a gross understatement to say that because the 
objective of the Law on the Supreme Court is not jeopardized by a 
postponement in their application, to order the requested provisional measures 
does impinge upon any sovereign right of the respondent State. It is not 
coincidence that this is the first time in the history of European integration, 
and after almost 70 years of its existence, that the ECJ ordered provisional 
measures, restorative of the status quo ante. 
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 This brings us to the most radical critique of the order in question, which 
lies in having being issued inaudita alter parte, pursuant to Art. 160 (7) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court. 12 No reason, however, is given for the 
application of the said provision, in addition to the three general requirements 
(fumus boni juris, urgency and weight up of the interests involved) for the 
issuance of provisional measures, examined above.13 
    
4. The provisional measures ordered and non-compliance scenarios 
The Order provisionally grants all the Commission’s requests.  
 Poland is ordered to adopt the following four interim measures: (1) to 
suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the 
lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges; (2) to take all 
necessary measures to ensure that the Supreme Court judges concerned by the 
provisions at issue may continue to perform their duties in the same post, while 
continuing to enjoy the same status and the same rights and working conditions 
as they did before the Law on the Supreme Court entered into force; (3) to 
refrain from adopting any measure concerning the appointment of judges to 
the Supreme Court to replace the Supreme Court judges concerned by those 
provisions, or any measure concerning the appointment of a new First 
President of the Supreme Court or indicating the person tasked with leading 
the Supreme Court in its First President’s stead pending the appointment of a 
new First President; and (4) to inform the Commission of all the measures it 
has adopted or plans to adopt in order to fully comply with the Order. 
 Because the Law on the Supreme Court was already in force at the date of 
the Order, the provisional measures apply, with retroactive effect, to all the 
judges of the Supreme Court concerned by the Polish Law on the Supreme 
Court. The judges of the Supreme Court to whom the Law refer, ought to keep 
their workplaces, even if they have already retired. As explained in the previous 
paragraph, the relief aims not only to preserve the situation pending the 
 
12 The rule is that an application for the adoption of interim measures referred to in Art. 279 TFEU 
“shall  be served on the opposite party, and the President shall prescribe a short time-limit within 
which that party may submit written or oral observations”. The President may also “order a 
preparatory inquiry” Art. 160 (5) and (6). On Art. 160(7), see supra, note 9.   
13 “Conformément à l’article 160, paragraphe 7, du règlement de procédure, le juge des référés 
peut faire droit à la demande en référé avant même que l’autre partie n’ait présenté ses observations 
et cette mesure peut être ultérieurement modifiée ou rapportée, même d’office. Selon la jurisprudence, 
en particulier lorsqu’il est souhaitable dans l’intérêt d’une bonne administration de la justice d’éviter 
que la procédure en référé ne soit vidée de toute sa substance et de tout effet, l’article 160, paragraphe 
7, du règlement de procédure autorise le juge connaissant d’une demande de mesures provisoires à 
arrêter de telles mesures, à titre conservatoire, soit jusqu’au prononcé de l’ordonnance mettant fin à 
l’instance en référé, soit jusqu’à la clôture de la procédure principale, si celle-ci a lieu plus tôt” (paras. 
12-13 of the Order). 
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outcome of the main proceedings, but also to restore the status quo ante the 
challenged measure.  
 These provisional measures will remain in force until such time as an order 
is adopted terminating the interim proceedings.14  
 Provisional measures are binding. Poland therefore is under an obligation 
under European law to comply with the Order. Because Poland challenges the 
very jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the infringement action brought 
by the European Commission, it seems unlikely that it will suspend the 
application of the Law on the Supreme Court at any time prior to the definition 
of the main proceedings on the merit. There is a precedent in this respect, and 
it is likely that Poland’s record of previous non-compliance with provisional 
measures might be at the origin of the harsh stance of the Vice-President. 
 In the Polish Forest Bialowieka case,15 the ECJ stated that in case of breach 
of an interim measure addressed to a member State, the Court upon the 
Commission’s request can impose penalty payments and pecuniary damages.16 
Should Poland fail to comply with the ordered provisional measures, therefore, 
the Commission could resort to a procedure analogous to that under Art. 260 
TFEU,17 whereby it “shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty 
payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court finds that the Member State 
concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or 
penalty payment on it” (para. 2). It has also been suggested, that in case Poland 
persists in its lack of compliance even with an order or judgment imposing a 
payment, the “Financial Regulation will have to be interpreted creatively so 
that the amounts receivable are offset by forthcoming payments to Poland.”18 
 
14 This order will be issued after Poland has submitted its observations within the proscribed time-
limit, in accordance with the ordinary procedure for interim measures under Art. 279(5) TFEU (supra, 
note 12).  
15 European Commission v. Republic of Poland (Białowieża Forest), Case C-441/17.  
16 In the Białowieża Forest case, the Commission had asked the Court to order Poland, pending 
delivery of the Court’s judgment on the merits, to cease, except where there is a threat to public safety, 
active forest management operations in certain habitats and forest stands, and to cease the removal of 
dead spruces that are a century old or more and the felling of trees as part of increased logging on the 
Puszcza Białowieska site. The Commission supplemented that application by a request for a penalty 
payment to be ordered in the event of failure to comply with the orders made. By order of 20 
November 2017, the Court granted that application. See Press Release 122/17, available at 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-11/cp170122en.pdf.  
17 Art. 260 TFEU regulates the action for failure to fulfil obligations directed against a member 
State which has failed to comply with its obligations under European Union law. If the Court of Justice 
finds that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, the member State concerned must comply with 
the Court’s judgment without delay. Where the Commission considers that the Member State has not 
complied with the judgment, it may bring a further action seeking financial penalties.  
18 D. SARMIENTO, Interim Revolutions: the CJEU gives its first interim measures ruling on the rule 
of law in Poland, in EU Law Analysis, available at 
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In this scenario, the consequences of the Polish leadership’s choices would be 
borne by the people of Poland.  
 
5. Parallel developments under the Rule of Law Framework and Art. 7(1) 
TEU procedure  
The EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Art. 2 TEU). Only European 
States which respect the values referred to in Art. 2 and are committed to 
promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU (Art. 49 TEU). 
Within the EU, the rule of law is of particular importance. Respect for the rule 
of law is a prerequisite for the protection of all the fundamental values listed in 
Art. 2 TEU. It is also a prerequisite for upholding all rights and obligations 
deriving from the treaties and from international law. 
 However, the so-called Art. 7 TEU procedure has never been resorted to. 
It was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam to include in addition to a 
sanctioning mechanism, an “early warning” (preventive) mechanism, i.e. a 
procedure to be triggered in case of a “clear risk of a serious breach” – rather 
than a “serious and persistent breach by a Member State” – of the EU common 
values. The preventive mechanism allows the Council to give the EU country 
concerned a warning before a “serious breach” has actually materialised. The 
sanctioning mechanism allows the Council to suspend certain rights deriving 
from the application of the Treaties to the EU country in question, including 
the voting rights of that country in the Council. In that case the “serious 
breach” must have persisted for some time. Both mechanisms are now 
enshrined in Art. 7 TEU. 
 In addition, in March 2014, the European Commission adopted the so-
called Rule of Law Framework,19 for addressing systemic threats to the rule of 
law in any of the EU’s member States. The new framework is complementary 
to both infringement procedures – when EU law has been breached – and the 
Art. 7 TEU procedure. It allows the Commission to enter into a dialogue with 
the member State concerned to prevent the escalation of systemic threats to 
the rule of law. In preparing its assessment, the Commission can draw on the 
expertise of other EU institutions and international organisations (notably, the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
etc.). If no solution is found within the Framework, Art. 7 TEU will always 
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remain the last resort to resolve a crisis and ensure compliance with EU 
values.20  
 In January 2016, the European Commission opened a dialogue with the 
Polish Government under the Rule of Law Framework. Between February and 
July 2016, the Commission and the Polish Government exchanged a number 
of letters and met at different occasions. They were not able, however, to find 
solution. On 1 June 2016, therefore, the Commission adopted an Opinion 
concerning the rule of law in Poland, formalising its assessment of the current 
situation and setting out the concerns of the Commission. On 27 July 2016, the 
Commission adopted its first Recommendation regarding the rule of law in 
Poland.21 The Recommendation found a systemic threat to the rule of law in 
Poland and recommended that the Polish authorities take appropriate action 
to address this threat as a matter of urgency. On 21 December 2016, the 
Commission adopted a second Recommendation regarding the rule of law in 
Poland.22 The Commission found that, whereas some of the issues raised in its 
first Recommendation had been addressed, important issues remained 
unresolved, and new concerns had arisen in the meantime. On 26 July 2017, 
the Commission adopted a third Recommendation regarding the Rule of Law 
in Poland,23 complementary to its Recommendations of 27 July and 21 
December 2016, where the Commission considered that the situation of a 
systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland as presented in its previous 
recommendations has seriously deteriorated. The Polish Government 
invariably replied disagreeing with all the assessments set out in the 
recommendations and did not announce any new action to address the 
 
20 The process is based on a continuous dialogue between the Commission and the Member State 
concerned. The Commission keeps the European Parliament and Council regularly informed. All EU 
institutions have a complementary role to play in promoting and maintaining the rule of law in the 
EU. In December 2014, the Council and the EU countries committed themselves to establishing an 
annual dialogue among all EU countries within the Council to promote and safeguard the rule of law 
in the framework of the treaties. The European Parliament has also at several occasions called for EU 
countries to be regularly assessed on their continued compliance with the fundamental values of the 
EU and the requirement of democracy and the rule of law.  
21 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland; OJ L 217, 12.8.2016, p. 53.   
22 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule of law 
in Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2017/146; OJ L 22, 27.1.2017, p. 65. On 14 
September 2016, the European Parliament had also adopted a Resolution on the situation in Poland, 
inter alia calling on the Polish Government to cooperate with the Commission pursuant to the 
principle of sincere cooperation as set out in the Treaty. On 14 October 2016, the Venice Commission 
adopted its opinion on the law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal. 
23 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146; OJ L 228, 2.9.2017, 
p. 19.   
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concerns identified by the Commission. A fourth Recommendation was issued 
on 20 December 2017.24 
 On the same date, due to a lack of progress through the Rule of Law 
Framework, the Commission activated the Art. 7(1) procedure for the first 
time, and submitted a Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the Council on the 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by Poland.25  
 At the General Affairs Council hearing on the rule of law in Poland on 26 
June 2018, no indication was given by the Polish authorities of forthcoming 
measures to address the Commission's concerns.26 On 18 September 2018, a 
second hearing on the rule of law in Poland was organised in the General 
Affairs Council in the context of the Art. 7(1) procedure. The Polish authorities 
again stood by their position and refused to propose any measures to address 
the concerns of the Commission and other member States.  
 On both occasions, the Council failed to trigger Art. 7.  The reasons lay in 
the political nature of the process. Art. 7(1) TEU provides for the Council, 
acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, to determine that there is a 
clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the common values referred 
to in Art. 2 of the Treaty. This a majority not easy to achieve.  
 In the LM case,27 however, the Court stated that judicial cooperation with 
Poland in criminal matters could come to an end even if Art. 7 TEU 
proceedings are not triggered against that State: cooperation could be 
automatically terminated only if the European Council were to adopt a 
decision determining, as provided for in Art. 7(2) TEU, that there is a serious 
and persistent breach in a member State of the principles set out in Art. 2. 
Nevertheless, as long as such a decision has not been adopted by the European 
Council, the executing judicial authority may still refrain to give effect to a 
European arrest warrant issued by a member State which is the subject of a 
reasoned proposal as referred to in Article 7(1) TEU, “where that authority 
finds, after carrying out a specific and precise assessment of the particular case, 
 
24 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/9050 of 20 December 12.2017 regarding the rule of 
law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 
and (EU) 2017/1520. 
25 European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, Proposal for a Council decision on the 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law,  20 
December 2017 (COM(2017) 835 final 2017/0360 (APP). 
26 It is in this context, that the European Commission launched the infringement procedure, 
discussed above. A Letter of Formal Notice to Poland was issued on 2 July 2018. The Polish 
authorities replied to the Letter of Formal Notice on 2 August 2018, rejecting the Commission's 
concerns. The Commission subsequently sent a Reasoned Opinion to the Polish authorities on the 
matter on 14 August 2018, and received a response on 14 September 2018, which again failed to 
alleviate the Commission's legal concerns. 
27 ECJ (Grand Chamber), judgment of 25 July 2018, LM (Case C-216/18 PPU). 
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that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person in respect of 
whom that European arrest warrant has been issued will, following his 
surrender to the issuing judicial authority, run a real risk of breach of his 
fundamental right to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of 
his fundamental right to a fair trial” (para. 73 of the judgment).28 
  
6. Concluding remarks on the intertwined relationship between judicial and 
political remedies to ensure compliance with the EU fundamental values 
Human rights, democracy and the rule of law lie at the foundation of the EU. 
Long protected by the ECJ as unwritten general principles, human rights are 
formally recognized as a matter of EU domestic constitutional law (Art. 6 TEU) 
and have acquired a prominent role as a limit to the legitimacy of acts by both 
the EU institutions and the member States (at least, when acting within the 
scope of EU law). They also officially entered the benchmarks to be met by 
new members before they obtain the economic benefits of the European 
internal market (Art. 49 TEU). The rule of law is one of the EU common values 
(Art. 2 TEU). The European Commission, together with the European 
Parliament and the Council, is responsible under the Treaties for guaranteeing 
the respect of the rule of law as a fundamental value of our Union and making 
sure that EU law, values and principles are respected. And the EU disposes of 
a specific political mechanism that should ensure respect of its fundamental 
values, in addition to a conspicuous apparatus of judicial remedies generally 
available to ensure that the law is observed.  
 Yet, when the rule of law is seriously questioned in one of its member States, 
responses are either lacking, inadequate or raise serious doubts as to their own 
consistency with the rule of law.  
 What seems effective is not workable (the political venue of Art. 7 TEU), 
what is workable might not be effective (the dialogue under the Rule of Law 
Framework), while what is both workable and effective (the provisional 
measures ordered within the same procedure) just seem to defeat rather than 
uphold the very same values they are intended to protect.   
 Art. 7 TEU aims at ensuring that all EU countries respect the common 
values of the EU, including the rule of law. The preventive mechanism of Art. 
7(1) TEU can be activated only in case of a “clear risk of a serious breach” and 
the sanctioning mechanism of Art. 7(2) TEU only in case of a “serious and 
persistent breach by a Member State” of the values set out in Art. 2. The 
Poland case shows, however, that the required majority may prove hard, if not 
 
28 The Irish High Court asked the ECJ whether European Arrest Warrants issued by Poland must 
be executed, in light of recent legislative changes concerning the Polish judiciary. The referral was 
made in the extradition case of Artur Celmer, wanted to face trial in his native Poland on drug 
trafficking charges and arrested in Ireland under a European Arrest Warrant in May 2018. 
14                  ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN THE EU 
 
© Osservatoriosullefonti.it, fasc. 3/2018 
impossible, to achieve even when the EU is faced with a serious challenge to 
its very founding values. 
 At the time of writing, the ongoing rule of law dialogue with Poland is still 
the Commission's preferred channel for resolving the systemic threat to the 
rule of law in Poland, but progress through the Rule of Law Framework seems 
hard to achieve.  
 The infringement procedure – in spite of the many uncertainties raised by 
the interim measures, without which it would also risk, however, to become 
ineffective by the time a final determination is given – appears as the most 
promising venue. 
 Law and politics are deeply intertwined, but there are situations in which 
this strikes us in a very particular way. The EU reaction to the worrying process 
of “rule of law backsliding” – first witnessed in Hungary and – now in Poland, 
is a case in point. 
  
